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1 Introduction 
The world suffered three major financial crises in the last ten years, namely, the 
European Monetary System (EMS) crisis in 1992-1993, the Mexican crisis in 
1994-1995 (which spread to a number of South American countries) and the Asian 
crisis in 1997- 1998. Economists usually believe these crises were the results of weak 
economic fundamentals, e.g. declining foreign reserve, increasing foreign debt, capital 
account and current account deficits, government fiscal deficit and so on. 
Obviously, a current account deficit can be a very important factor because, other 
things being equal, it increases foreign debt, decreases foreign reserves and weakens 
confidence in the exchange rate of the domestic currency. Almost all countries that 
suffered financial crises had faced rising current account deficits before the crises 
occurred. So such deficits are widely regarded as an important factor of financial crises. 
International trade links play an important role in the so called "contagious effect", 
i.e., a crisis in one country causes a new crisis in another country with relatively good 
fundamentals. Glick and Rose (1999) provided some analysis of the relationship 
between trade and contagion; while Forbes (2001) went further to construct some 
statistics measuring the importance of trade linkages in transmitting crises. 
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Since most economists agree that international trade is one of the important factors 
in explaining financial crises, it seems natural and logical to ask the reverse question: 
what are the effects of financial crises on international trade? Surprisingly, little 
research on this subject has been done. Perhaps the reason is that the answer appears to 
be obvious. Conventional wisdom would predict that a financial crisis, by bringing 
about a recession in the macro economy, would lead to a drop in imports. Exports, 
however, may rise because of both a decline in domestic demand and devaluation of the 
domestic currency. A weakening or collapse of the financial system, in particular the 
banking system, however, might weaken the country's export capability. So the 
aggregate effects of a financial crisis on the macro economy are unclear. This paper 
tries to ascertain whether the ambiguity can be resolved empirically. 
We divide all the past financial crises into two types: banking crisis and currency 
crisis. These two different types of crises had different attributes and different effects 
on international trade. This paper begins by analyzing theoretically the effects of 
banking and currency crises on international trade. Then it uses bilateral trade data, 
macroeconomic data and geographic data to test the theoretical predictions. Overall, the 
empirical results provide support for the theoretical predictions. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides a theoretical 
framework for understanding the impact of financial crises on international trade and 
the channels of crises transmission through trade. Second, it estimates the effects of 
banking crises and currency crises on imports and exports. The estimated results can be 
used to predict the impact of financial crises on trade, thus providing useful information 
for risk management to policy makers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
works on the relationship between international trade and financial crisis. Sections 3 
and 4 analyze the effects of banking crises and of currency crises on trade respectively.  3
Section 5 describes the data and methods used to estimate the effects of these crises. 
Section 6 reports the results of empirical estimation and statistical testing. Section 7 
concludes. 
2  Literature Review: Trade and Financial Crises 
Economists pay attention to the role played by trade in financial crises for two 
reasons. First, trade imbalance has been shown to be one of the important factors that 
trigger financial crises. Current deficits may decrease foreign reserves. As Krugman 
(1973) pointed out, a currency crisis is more likely to happen in an economy which does 
not have enough foreign reserves. Second, financial crises may be transmitted through 
trade linkages from an affected country to others despite the latter's relatively good 
fundamentals. In explaining such contagion effects, economists have tried to identify 
the channels through which contagion was spread. As trade is the most obvious 
economic linkage between countries, much research has been devoted to this 
connection. While the importance of trade imbalance in triggering crises is widely 
accepted, there is no agreement on the importance of trade in transmitting financial 
crises. 
Eichengreen and Rose (1999) used a binary-probit model to test whether bilateral 
trade linkages transmitted crises between industrial countries between 1959 and 1993. 
They found that the probability of a financial crisis occurring in a country increased 
significantly if the country had high bilateral trade linkages with countries in crises. 
They concluded that trade was an important factor. Glick and Rose (1999) conducted a 
similar analysis with more countries between 1971 and 1997 and obtained a similar 
result. Forbes (2000) used company's stock market data to study the importance of trade 
in financial crises transmission and his result also showed that trade played an 
important role.  4
However, other papers have provided different answers to the problem. For instance, 
Goldfajn (1998) thought that trade was unimportant in the East Asian Crisis because the 
direct bilateral trade volumes between these economies were very small. Masson 
(1998), analyzing the Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis, obtained similar results. 
All the papers that analyzed the relationship between trade and financial crises 
ignored the reverse question: how did financial crises affect international trade? We 
argue that the effects of financial crises on trade are a precondition for discussing 
whether trade transmits crises. If financial crises do not affect countries' imports and 
exports at all, how can financial crises be transmitted through the trade channel? So, 
before we analyze the importance of trade in transmitting financial crises, we need to 
clarify the effects of financial crises on international trade. As pointed out above, little 
work has been done on this topic to date. It seems there is a belief that financial crises 
only affect countries' imports and exports through changes in the exchange rates. Since 
the effects of exchange rates have already been thoroughly analyzed before, it may 
seem that there is no need to study the question. However, this view may not be correct. 
A devaluation of a national currency will increase the volume of exports and reduce 
the volume of imports. Classic international trade theory shows that a devaluation 
improves the trade balance if the Marshall--Lerner condition is satisfied. Since in a 
financial crisis a country usually experienced a devaluation of its national currency, the 
same analysis would apply, i.e., the affected countries' imports will decrease but their 
exports will increase after the crises. 
Furthermore, financial crises (including currency crises, banking crises or both) 
could also affect trade through channels besides the exchange rate. Reinhart (1999) 
pointed out that financial crises usually caused capital account reversal ("sudden stop") 
and triggered an economic recession. Mendoza (2001) showed that in an economy with 
imperfect credit markets these sudden stops could be an equilibrium outcome. The  5
economic recession reduces not only domestic demand, but also total output and export 
capability, whereas capital outflow forces the country to increase export. Thus, whether 
exports increase or decrease after financial crises is unclear without further analysis. 
Before we analyze how financial crises affect the crisis countries' imports and 
exports, let us first define financial crises. Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) have 
provided definitions of currency crises and banking crises: 
"For an episode to qualify as a currency crisis, we must observe a forced change in 
parity, abandonment of a pegged exchange rate, or an international rescue. For an 
episode to qualify as a banking crisis, we must observe either bank runs, widespread 
bank failures and suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency such that the 
latter circulates at a premium relative to deposits (a banking panic), or significant 
banking sector problems (including but not limited to bank failures) resulting in the 
erosion of most or all of banking system collateral that are resolved by a 
fiscally-underwritten bank restructuring." 
The above definitions are adopted in this paper. In next two sections, we analyze the 
effects of banking crises and currency crises on the macro-economy and trade. 
3  Impact of Banking Crises 
A classical framework of bank runs was developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
Let us recapitulate the key elements of their model. Agents are endowed with goods 
which can be invested in a long term project or stored without costs. The long term 
project is profitable but illiquid, i.e., if investors do not liquidate the project before it 
matures, its return is greater than the initial investment; however, if the project is 
liquidated before it matures, the fire sale return is less than the initial investment. Each 
agent can be impatient or patient with fixed probabilities, but there is no aggregate 
uncertainty, i.e., the total number of impatient agents is fixed and known by all agents.  6
At the beginning, agents do not know their own types but must decide if they will invest 
in the project. After they have invested (or have decided not to invest) but before the 
project matures, each agent realizes his/her own type. Impatient agents must consume 
immediately whereas patient agents do not consume anything until the project matures. 
Agents' types are private information, so even if each agent knows his/her own type, 
other people do not know. 
On the one hand, if an agent does not invest in the project but turns out to be patient, 
then he/she has missed a profitable investment opportunity. On the other hand, if he/she 
invests in the project but turns out to be impatient, he/she will have suffered a loss. In 
this case, he/she has to liquidate the long term investment before it matures. 
Agents can improve their utilities by pooling risk through the creation of a bank. All 
agents deposit their goods in the bank. Depending to the number of impatient agents, 
the bank sets aside a part of deposits as reserves and invests the rest in the project. 
When agents realize their types, impatient agents withdraw their deposits from the 
bank's reserves and patient agents wait for the project to mature. After the project 
matures, the bank distributes the return of the project to patient agents. By way of 
pooling risk through the bank, impatient agents do not suffer fire sale losses and patient 
agents can enjoy the benefits of the project. 
However, there is a problem because agents' types are private information. Patient 
can pretend to be impatient and withdraw their deposits before the project matures. 
Normally, they have no incentive to do so because withdrawing early decreases their 
utilities. However, patient agents may wish to withdraw their deposits if there is panic. 
When that happens, the bank's reserves will not be enough to meet the agents' demand. 
The bank has to liquidate the long term project before it matures, but it cannot meet the 
withdrawal if all patient agents try to withdraw because the fire sale return of the project 
is less than the initial investment. The result is a bank run and some agents get nothing  7
back. 
The above is the classical framework of bank runs. It does not analyze the effect of 
bank runs on imports and exports. We extend this model to feature international trade 
by making four additional assumptions. 
1. We assume that agents belong to two categories: local agents and foreign agents. 
Local agents are endowed with local goods and foreign agents are endowed with 
foreign goods. Both foreign and local agents may be patient or impatient with the same 
probability. Both local and foreign goods can be bought and sold in the international 
market. 
2. The long term project needs both foreign and local goods as inputs, and it 
produces local goods. As the aggregate investment increases, the investment demand 
for local and foreign goods also increases. For simplicity, we assume that foreign 
agents' deposits are less than the investment demand for the foreign good. So the bank 
always has to export some local goods for the sake of importing foreign goods. 
3. Foreign agents only consume foreign goods, and local agents consume both local 
and foreign goods. The returns that agents receive from the bank are local goods, so 
they need to exchange a part or all of the return for foreign goods in the international 
market. 
4. There are overlapping generations. When the project matures, a new generation of 
agents appears. Like the previous generation, they deposit their goods in the bank and 
the bank invests deposits in a new long term project. We assume that the number of 
local agents is fixed but the number of foreign agents depends on the experience of the 
previous generation. If no bank run occurs in the previous generation, the number of 
new foreign agents will be the same. Otherwise, the number of new foreign agents will 
decrease, i.e., capital inflow decreases after a bank run. 
We can analyze the impact of banking crises on imports and exports under the above  8
assumptions. If a bank run occurs before the project matures, all agents withdraw their 
deposits. Due to the illiquidity of the project, only some of them can get their deposits 
back. On the average, agents suffer losses. All foreign agents (with out a bank run, only 
impatient foreign agents) leave the economy bringing with them the withdrawal. After 
the banking crisis, capital inflow decreases. So banking crises affect international trade 
through three channels. 
1. Income channel. If a bank run occurs, the bank has to liquidate the long term 
investment before it matures and all depositors suffer some losses. With a lower income, 
local agents' demand for foreign goods goes down. Through this channel, both imports 
and exports decrease during and after banking crises. 
2. Foreign capital flow channel. In the absence of bank runs, patient foreign agents 
withdraw after the project matures, but the withdrawal would be offset by an inflow of 
new investment made by the next generation of foreign agents. However, a bank run 
causes them to withdraw early and also reduces new foreign investment in the future. 
So banking crises can stimulate exports during crises but reduces them after crises. 
3. Investment demand channel. As aggregate investment decreases, the input 
demand for foreign goods drops. So banking crises have negative longer term effects on 
imports through this channel. On the other hand, as foreign investment decreases, the 
economy must export more local goods to import foreign goods as investment input. As 
a result, banking crises will simulate exports after crises. 
The real world is more complicated than that highlighted in the above theoretical 
framework. For instance, developed countries usually may be able to save their banking 
systems when banking crises occurred, so net capital outflow might not happen. As a 
second example, some less-developed countries (e.g., some African countries) are 
unsuccessful in attracting a lot of foreign capital, so the impact of capital flow would be 
insignificant during banking crises. As a third example, several Latin American  9
countries (e.g., Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela) stopped repaying foreign debt during 
debt crises in 1980s, so the amount of net foreign capital outflow would be less than that 
suggested by the theoretical analysis. 
4  Impact of Currency Crises 
Currency crises often occur due to one of two reasons: run away fiscal deficits or 
external shocks. We analyze them in turn. As Krugman (1973) pointed out, if a 
government cannot control its budget deficit, it has to finance the deficit by printing 
money, thus triggering currency depreciation. The currency crises in Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina would be a case in point. 
An external shock (may be a currency crisis in another country) may cause the 
demand for local products to decrease in the international market. If the economy's 
exchange rate remains unchanged, it must experience a price deflation, which is often a 
painful process because cutting prices is difficult, and cutting the civil servants' salary 
may be particularly challenging. During a price deflation, firms usually suffer losses 
while unemployment rises. To minimize the social costs, the government may choose 
to give up the fixed exchange rate regime. A case in point would be the experience of 
Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore before and during the Asian financial crisis. 
These economies faced competition in their export market from China, and the 
devaluation of the Japanese Yen in 1996 worsened their trade position further. They 
discovered that their cost structures were too high to support their currencies, so they 
had to give up the fixed exchange rates despite their relatively good fundamentals. The 
Thai government gave up its fixed exchange rate in July 1997, triggering the Asian 
financial crisis. Even through Hong Kong's currency board was maintained, it paid a 
heavy price in the form of price deflation and fiscal deficit. 
During a currency crisis, the exchange rate would be more uncertain. Importers and  10
exporters are exposed to greater exchange rate risk, and may choose to reduce their 
business to reduce their exposure. As a result, currency crises may have negative 
impacts on imports and exports in the short term. 
In the longer term, the market equilibrium is gradually restored. However, imports 
and exports may not return to the original level because a currency crisis can produce 
persistent impact on imports and exports through three channels. 
1. Income channel. This channel exists if a crisis is triggered by external shocks. As 
the demand for local products declines, the consumer's income falls. So both imports 
and exports decline. 
2. Substitution effect channel. This channel exists if a crisis triggered by external 
shocks. As the relative price of local products decreases, consumers tend to increase 
their consumption of local product and decrease their demand for foreign goods, so 
both imports and exports decrease. 
3. Wealth channel. Regardless of whether a currency devaluation is caused by a 
fiscal deficit or an external shock, consumers always suffer wealth losses due to money 
holdings, forcing consumers to decrease their consumption. As consumers' demand for 
foreign goods decreases, imports decrease; as their demand for local product decreases, 
other things being equal, the economy is able to export more. 
If a devaluation is expected, consumers can reduce losses by reducing their money 
holdings. They can exchange domestic currency for foreign currency before the 
devaluation and then reverse the process after the devaluation. If the cash-in-advance 
constraint holds, their consumption would decrease during the devaluation as they 
reduce their money holding in anticipation of the devaluation. As a result, imports 
decrease and, if the price elasticity of demand for exports is larger than unity, the value 
of exports increases in the short term. After the devaluation, however, consumptions 
may return to the original level. So expected devaluations will have only short term  11
impact on imports and exports. 
However, according to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), currency crisis often 
occurred when governments abandoned their fixed exchange rates suddenly. The 
Mexico crisis was a good example. Before the abandonment of its fixed exchange rate, 
interest rate of Peso was relative low and the market did not predict the devaluation. In 
short, most currency crises were unexpected, and thus the impact on imports and 
exports through the wealth channel would be larger than if the crises were expected. 
5  Data, Crises, and Estimation Model 
Having analyzed in theory the effects of banking crises and currency crises on 
foreign trade, let us use real world data to test the above theoretical predictions. 
The data include bilateral export value from 1981 to 1998 as contained in World 
Trade Database; GDP, population and exchange rate data between 1979 and 1998 as 
contained in the International Financial Statistics; distances, common land border, the 
number of the landlocked countries and the number of the island countries as contained 
in Frankel and Rose (2002)'s database. Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) have provided a 
list of financial crises found in the major economies (Table 1). We use the same list in 
our analysis because the included countries are sufficiently representative. 
**** Table 1 here **** 
We show the frequency of currency crises and banking crises in Figure 1 and 2, 
respectively. There were 128 currency crises between 1980 and 1998. As shown in 
Figure 1, the number of currency crisis peaked in 1982, 1986 and 1992, with more than 
10 crises each year. In 1982, the debt crisis occurred in many Latin American countries, 
and five Latin American countries had currency crises. In addition, six other countries 
experienced currency crises due to high US interest rate. In 1986, there were 13 
currency crises in both developed and developing countries, spreading over Asia,  12
Africa, Europe, North and South America. In 1992, many European countries quit EMS 
under speculative attacks. In 1997 and 1998, several Asian countries that had stable 
exchange rates for a long time, such as Malaysia and Korea, experienced currency 
crises, even though the frequency of currency crises was not significantly higher than 
the average level 
**** Figure 1 here **** 
**** Figure 2 here **** 
According to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002)'s definition, currency crises do not 
always manifest themselves as currency devaluations. For instance, the Swedish Krona 
did not depreciate in 1992 but Sweden's central bank had to rely on an international 
rescue effort to defend its currency. Therefore, we regard that as a currency crisis. In 
contrast, while the Hong Kong dollar was attacked in 1997 and 1998, there was neither 
devaluation nor international rescue. Therefore, we do not classify that as a currency 
crisis. We classify currency crises that ended with devaluations as "successful" 
currency crises, and the others as "unsuccessful" currency crises. According to these 
definitions, 113 currency crises were successful and 15 were unsuccessful. 
There were 53 banking crises between 1980 and 1998. From Figure 2 we can see that 
in 1981, 1987, 1994 and 1998, there were more than five crises each year. These peaks 
of banking crises were close to the peaks of currency crises. 
If a banking crisis and a currency crisis occur in a country in the same year, we 
regard that as a "twin crisis." There were five twin crises during 1980-1998. This 
definition is not perfect, because it ignores some cases in which that banking crisis and 
currency crisis occurred closely but in subsequent calendar years. 
We use bilateral trade data to test the theoretical predictions because we would like 
to isolate external effects that vary across countries. For example, if a country and its 
main trading partner fall into financial crises at the same time, the country's exports and  13
imports are affected by both internal and external shocks. However, we would not be 
able to include the external shock as explanatory variable if we use their aggregated 
(across countries) trade data. The use of bilateral trade data allows us to include the 
importing and exporting countries' crisis dummies as explanatory variables, thus 
avoiding biases caused by inappropriate use of dummies in analyzing aggregate trade 
data. 
The gravity model is widely used to estimate bilateral trade value. The basic idea is 
that trade between any pair of countries is positively related to their economic sizes, but 
inversely related to the distance between them. Some other factors, such as common 
land border, can also affect bilateral trade value. This methodology has proven to be 
successful in explaining variations in bilateral trade. We extend the gravity model by 
including crisis variables. The regression equation to be adopted is as follows. 
logexportt,i,e    logexportt1,i,e  1Xt,i,e  2Yt1,i,e  3Yt2,i,e
 4Ct  5Ct1  6Ct2  C    t  t,i,e
 
 
where  ,, exp tie ort  is exports from country e to country i at time t. As trade relationships 
take time to build and to break, we allow for the underlying continuity of trade over 
time by including  1, , log(exp ) ti e ort −   as an explanatory variable.  ,, tie X   is a set of 
macroeconomic variables that affect trade between country i and e at time t. Based on 
the gravity equation framework, X  is taken to include the following variables: igdp, 
the log of GDP of the importing country; egdp, the log of GDP of the exporting 
country; ipop, the log of the population of importing country; epop, the log of the 
population of exporting country; dis, the log of the distance between importing and 
exporting countries; comland , a common land border dummy equal to 1 if the trading 
countries have a common land border and 0 otherwise; nland , the number of trading  14
countries being landlocked (i.e., 0, 1 or 2); nisland , the number of trading countries 
being islands countries (i.e., 0, 1, or 2); C  is constant term;  1 log log tt t idev iex iex − = − , 
the rate of devaluation of the importing country's currency relative to US dollar, where 
t iex  is the exchange rate ( measured in domestic currency/ US dollar) of the importing 
country's currency at time t;  1 log log tt t edev eex eex − = − , the rate of devaluation of the 
exporting country's currency relative to US dollar. 
Since a currency devaluation has both short term and longer term effects, the 
explanatory variables  1, , ti e Y −  and  2, , ti e Y −   include the first and second lag of the 
devaluation variables, namely, lagidev, lagedev,  2 lag idev and  2 lag edev. 
To capture the possibility of time trends, we also include time t as an explanatory 
variable. 
  t C ,  1 t C −  and  2 t C −  are crisis dummy variables and their first and second lags.  t C  
includes  t bi ,  t be ,  t ci  and  t ce , the banking crisis dummies of the importing and 
exporting countries, and the currency crisis dummies of the importing and exporting 
countries, respectively. 
 0 t bi =  if country i does not fall into a banking crisis at time t; 
 1 otherwise. 
 0 t ce =  if country i does not fall into a currency crisis at time t; 
 1 otherwise. 
We analyze how financial crises affected foreign trade over a period of three 
consecutive years. The effects on trade during the crisis years are regarded as "short 
term" and the effects on trade one and two years after crises are regarded as "longer 
term." We do not consider lags in excess of two years because the major crises were not 
more than three years apart. For example, the EMS crisis (1992-93), the Mexican crisis  15
(1994-95) and the Asian crisis (1997-98). 
6  Estimation Results and Statistical Tests 
We divide the data into two groups: 1982-1990 and 1991-1998, and estimate 
separately regressions for each period. This allows us to compare the effects of 
financial crises in different periods. 
6.1 Gravity Model with Lagged Dependent Variables and Rates of 
Devaluation 
Before we examine the impact of financial crises, let us check the behavior of the 
gravity model with a lagged dependent variable and rates of devaluation, i.e., 
,, 1 ,, 1 ,, 2 1 ,, 3 2 ,, ,, log(exp ) log(exp ) tie t ie tie t ie t ie tie ort ort X Y Y C t λ θθ θ γ ε −− − = ⋅+ + + + + ⋅ +  
where  ,, tie X  includes igdp , egdp , ipop , epop , dis , comland , nland  and nisland . 
The devaluation variables are either omitted or included. 
The estimation results when the devaluation variables are omitted are reported in the 
first two columns of Table 2. The model's fit is relatively good. In both periods, R2  is 
greater than 0.93. Most coefficients are significant and their signs are consistent with 
theoretical predictions of the gravity model. An unstable result is time trend: it was 
significantly positive during 1982-1990 but significantly negative during 1991-1998. 
Since the volume of trade for all countries are expressed in U.S. dollars, the changing 
value of U.S. dollar over time may provide some clues. The value of the U.S. 
consumers' price index (CPI) increased by 41.5% during 1982-1990, but by 22.6% 
1991-1998. So even if the time trend of the real value of exports were the same, the time 
trend of exports measured in current US dollars could be different. 
Other differences between the two periods include the coefficients of ipop, epop, 
comland  and  nland . Although the signs of the coefficients for these population 
variables in both periods are negative, the absolute values decreased significantly in  16
1990s. The absolute values of the coefficients of comland  and nland  in 1991-1998 
were higher than those in 1982-1990. 
**** Table 2 here **** 
Next, we add the rates of devaluation and their lags idev , exdev, lagidev, lagedev, 
2 lag idev and  2 lag edev as explanatory variables. The results are reported in last two 
columns of Table 2. 
The signs of all the newly added explanatory variables are identical in both periods. 
To understand the effects of devaluation, we draw impulse response functions in Figure 
3.1 and 3.2 by considering devaluations of 50%, or equivalently by setting idev  and 
edev  equal to 0.4055. 
**** Figure 3.1 here **** 
**** Figure 3.2 here **** 
In Figure 3.1 and 3.2, either in 1980s or in 1990s, devaluations had negative impact 
on imports. However, the impact was short-term. Except for the effects on GDP, 
imports almost fully recovered in the second year after the devaluation. In contrast, the 
impact of devaluations on exports was somewhat more complicated. In the year of 
devaluation, exports decreased, but a year later, exports rebounded significantly, only 
to decrease again in the second year after the devaluation. 
The results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. If a devaluation is 
expected to occur, then consumers reduce their cash holdings to avoid loss, decreasing 
consumption, decreasing imports and increasing exports in the short term. After the 
devaluation, consumption rebounds so imports and exports return to the original level. 
The decrease in exports in the devaluation year may be due to the low price elasticity of 
exports in the short term, but the result that the longer term exports are less than the 
original level is hard to explain because it would be questionable whether the price  17
elasticity of demand for exports would remain less than unity two years after 
devaluation. 
6.2  Adding Crisis Dummies 
Now let us add financial crisis dummies to the regression equation. First, we include 
banking crisis dummy and currency crisis dummy separately. The results are reported 
in Table 3. 
**** Table 3 here **** 
The first two columns of Table 3 show that the impact of banking crises was unclear 
between 1982-1990. The short term effects on imports and exports were insignificant, 
and the longer term effects were negative but not always significant. The results for 
1991-1998 were more significant. Imports decreased significantly in all three years. 
Exports increased in the crisis years but fell back in the first year after banking crisis. 
Impulse response functions induced by the banking crisis dummy are presented in 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2. We focus on the results for 1991-1998 in Figure 4.2. The impact on 
imports not only was negative but also tended to decrease further. 
**** Figure 4.1 here **** 
**** Figure 4.2 here **** 
The last two columns of Table 3 show the effects of currency crises, and the impulse 
response functions induced by the currency crisis dummies are showed in Figure 5.1 
and 5.2. From the table and figures, we find that the effects on imports in the two 
periods were very similar. In both periods, imports decreased in all three years. 
However, the effects on exports in the two periods were somewhat different. In 
1982-1990, there was a significant negative impact of currency crises on exports in the 
short term (i.e., the coefficients of  t ce  and  1 t lagce −  were significantly negative), and 
the negative impact was mitigated but not reversed in the second year after crises. In  18
stark contrast, the effects of currency crises on exports in 1991-1998 were significantly 
positive in all three years. 
**** Figure 5.1 here **** 
**** Figure 5.2 here **** 
When all crisis dummies are included as explanatory variables, the results are 
reported in Table 4. The results for banking crises are very similar to those obtained 
above when currency crisis dummies were omitted (Table 3). In 1982-1990, the effects 
of banking crises were insignificant except for the coefficient of  t lagbi . Figure 6.1 
shows impulse response functions induced by the banking crisis dummies. In 
1991-1998, imports decreased and exports increased significantly in the short term, and 
both imports and exports decreased in the longer term. Comparing the impulse response 
functions in Figure 6.2 with Figure 4.2, we find that after controlling for the effects of 
currency crises, the accumulated impact of banking crises in the second year after crises 
was negative. 
**** Table 4 here **** 
**** Figure 6.1 here **** 
**** Figure 6.2 here **** 
The results for currency crises are similar to those obtained above when banking 
crisis dummies were omitted. In both periods, imports decreased in all three years. The 
impact of currency crises on exports was significant except that during the crisis year in 
1982-1990. The impulse response functions for the currency crisis dummy during the 
two periods are given in Figure 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. In 1982-1990, exports 
decreased in the short term and remained below the original level despite a subsequent 
recovery. In 1991-1998, the short term effect on exports was insignificant and exports 
exceeded the original level beginning in the first year after currency crises. After  19
controlling the effects of banking crises, the impact of currency crises on exports was 
insignificant during the crisis years. So the significantly positive coefficient of cet in 
Table 3 seems to be the result of omitting the banking crisis dummies. 
**** Figure 7.1 here **** 
**** Figure 7.2 here **** 
We summarize the theoretical predictions and empirical results about the impact of 
banking crises and currency crises in Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Because the 
model includes GDP and devaluation as explanatory variables, the effects of the crisis 
dummies capture the effects of crises through channels other than economic recession 
or currency devaluation. Theoretical analysis predicts that exports increase during 
banking crises due to foreign outflow, and in the longer term changes in exports depend 
on the aggregate effect through the foreign capital flow channel and the investment 
demand channel; imports would decrease due to reduction in investment demand. 
**** Table 5.1 here **** 
**** Table 5.2 here **** 
In 1982-90, the empirical results for banking crises do not support the theoretical 
predictions. In particular, there was no increase in exports during banking crises. 
Perhaps the theoretical predictions were inappropriate for this period because many 
developing countries stopped repaying foreign debts when they struggled with the 
financial crises. Furthermore, the amount foreign capital flow into less developed 
economies was relatively modest. 
The empirical results for 1991-1998 were broadly consistent with theoretical 
predictions. The negative longer term effect of banking crises on imports is as predicted. 
Although the theories predict the short term effect on imports to be insignificant, the 
empirical negative impact on imports during crisis years may be due to the use of  20
annual data (as opposed to quarterly or monthly data), which might have been 
influenced by the longer term effects. The positive impact on exports in the short term 
is consistent with the theoretical prediction about the effect of capital outflow. The 
results that exports decreased in the longer term (the second year after crisis) implies 
that the negative effect via capital flow channel overwhelmed the positive effect 
through investment demand channel. 
Theoretical analysis predicts that currency crises had negative impact on imports 
both in the short term (due to market chaos) and the longer term (due to wealth loss plus 
substitution effect if crisis was triggered by external shocks). The short term effect on 
exports are negative, but the longer term effect was ambiguous because the positive 
effect via the wealth channel ran counter to the negative effect via the substitution effect 
if the crisis was triggered by external shocks. 
Comparing the empirical results of currency crises with the theoretical predictions, 
we discover three phenomena. First, consistent with theoretical predictions, the impact 
of currency crises on imports were negative in both the short term and the longer term. 
Second, the short term effect via market chaos channel in 1991-1998 was weaker than 
that in 1982-1990, so exports decreased significantly in crisis years in 1982-1990 but 
did not change significantly in 1991-1998. Third, in 1982-1990, exports after the crisis 
recovered but still remained below the original level. We are not certain whether it was 
due to a weakening of the short term effect or if the longer term effect had kicked in. In 
contrast, in 1991-1998, exports increased significantly after currency crises, implying 
that the impact via the wealth channel overwhelmed the impact through the substitution 
effect channel. Generally, the empirical results in both periods are broadly consistent 
with theoretical predictions. 
6.3  Twin Crises, Successful and Unsuccessful Crises 
Let us check for the effects of twin crises by adding a twin crisis dummy  21
tt t tc bi ci =× and its first and second lags. Clearly  1 t tci =  if and only if both  t bi  and  t ci  
are equal to 1. 
The estimation results are listed in Table 6. Most coefficients of the twin crisis 
dummy variables are insignificant even though the values of the coefficients are not 
small in relative terms. 
**** Table 6 here **** 
As we pointed out above, currency crises may be "successful" or "unsuccessful". 
Since currency devaluations did not occur in unsuccessful currency crises, their impact 
could be different from that of successful crises. We separate the currency crisis 
dummies into two more refined groups of variables: sc stands for a successful currency 
crisis (i.e., both currency crisis and devaluation happen); fc stands for an unsuccessful 
currency crisis (i.e., a currency crisis without devaluation). The results are reported in 
Table 7. Since most currency crises were successful, it is not surprising that the 
coefficients of sc are close of those of c in Table 4. We find that the longer term 
effects of unsuccessful currency crises were unclear: almost all coefficients of lagfc  
and  2 lag fc are insignificant. However, the short term effects of unsuccessful crises in 
the two periods were different. In 1982-1990, imports did not change significantly but 
exports decreased significantly after an unsuccessful currency crisis. However, in 
1991-1998, an unsuccessful currency had negative effects on imports but positive 
effects on exports. Most of the other coefficients were not affected by the separation 
into two different currency crisis variables. 
**** Table 7 here **** 
6.4  How large are the effects on trade 
Since the variables are expressed in logarithmic terms, we can compute the size of 
the effects from the regression results contained in Table 5 and using the impulse  22
response functions in Figure 6 and 7. In 1991-1998, a country's imports on average 
would decline by about 9.7% during the year in which a banking crisis occurred, by 
13% in the first year after crises, by 14.5% in the subsequent year; exports would 
increase by about 8.8% during the crisis year, by 5% in the first year after crisis, but 
decrease by 2% in the second year after crisis. The country's imports would drop by 
about 4.3% during the year in which a successful currency crisis occurred, by 9.7% and 
12.4% in the subsequent two years, respectively; exports would increase by about 0.5% 
(insignificant) during the crisis year, by about 5% and 9% in the two subsequent years 
after crises, respectively. The results show that the impact of financial crises on 
international trade was very strong. 
7  Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
We have analyzed how financial crises affected international trade in the last two 
decades, an important question largely ignored by the literature. Our theoretical 
analysis predicts that imports will decrease during and after a banking crisis, whereas 
exports will rise during but fall after the crisis. Theoretical analysis predicts imports and 
exports will fall during currency crises but the effect after the crisis depends on the 
source of external shocks. By estimating a model of bilateral trade between 50 countries 
over a period of 19 years with real world data, we have found that the empirical results 
are generally consistent the theoretical predictions, especially in 1991-1998. The 
empirical results also show that after currency crises exports increased more 
significantly in 1991-1998 than that in 1982-1990. That may be a clue of "contagious 
crisis" in the last decade. 
This paper has focused on the value of trade, but an alternative measure would be the 
volume of trade. In addition, the impact of financial crises on different tradable goods 
may be different. It would be interesting to explore whether the relationships between  23
trade and financial crisis varied systematically across different products. For instance, 
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Table 2: gravity equation without crisis dummies. 
 1982-1990  1991-1998  1982-1990  1991-1998 
Lag export  0.87089 (0.00323)***  0.86802 (0.00318)*** 0.86957 (0.00323)*** 0.86896 (0.00319)***
igdp  0.13928 (0.00532)***  0.11356 (0.00478)*** 0.13255 (0.00532)*** 0.11274 (0.00481)***
egdp  0.14958 (0.00576)***  0.13325 (0.00518)*** 0.15153 (0.00584)*** 0.13073 (0.00523)***
ipop -0.02198(0.00432)***  -0.00774 (0.00365)** -0.01444 (0.00434)***-0.00794 (0.00371)**
epop  -0.03737 (0.00443)*** -0.00831 (0.00368)** -0.03899 (0.00446)***-0.00613 (0.00374)***
idev      -0.18552 (0.01417)***-0.07608 (0.02107)***
edev      -0.04551 (0.01411)***-0.05185 (0.02113)***
lagidev      -0.06591 (0.01708)***-0.03792 (0.01838)**
lagedev      0.06308 (0.01700)*** 0.06076 (0.01840)***
lag2idev      0.19746 (0.02029)*** 0.09049 (0.01316)***
lag2edev      -0.02290 (0.02011)  -0.04737 (0.01311)***
dis  -0.13329 (0.00764)*** -0.11617 (0.00703)***-0.12433 (0.00765)***-0.11599 (0.00703)***
comland  0.04533 (0.03067)  0.11118 (0.02800)*** 0.08437 (0.03081)*** 0.10838 (0.02813)***
nland  -0.00637 (0.01469)  -0.09191 (0.01320)***-0.01318 (0.01469)  -0.09007 (0.01320)***
nisland  0.05365 (0.00959)***  0.03890 (0.00870)*** 0.04458 (0.00968)*** 0.03878 (0.00874)***
year  0.01406 (0.00202)***  -0.01277 (0.00201)***0.01496 (0.00202)*** -0.01265 (0.00206)***
Observations 21500 20084 21500 20084
R² 0.9317  0.9468 0.9326 0.947
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 




Currency crisis  
frequency   
Banking crisis  
frequency 
Currency crisis  
frequency 
Argentina  4 6  Japan  1 0 
Australia  1 2  Korea Rp  2 3 
Austria  0 0  Malaysia  2 2 
Bangladesh  1 2  Mexico  2 6 
Belgium-Lux  0 1  Netherlands  0 1 
Brazil  2 3  New Zealand  1 3 
Canada  0 2  Nigeria  1 6 
Chile  1 2  Norway  1 1 
China  0 4  Pakistan  0 5 
Colombia  1 0  Paraguay  1 3 
Costa Rica  1 1  Peru  1 4 
Denmark  1 2  Philippines  2 5 
Ecuador  1 5  Portugal  0 1 
Egypt  2 1  Singapore  1 1 
Finland  1 3  South Africa  1 7 
France  1 1  Spain  0 3 
Germany  0 0  Sri Lanka  1 0 
Greece  0 2  Sweden  1 1 
Hong Kong  2 0  Switzerland  0 0 
Iceland  0 2  Thailand  3 2 
India  1 2  Turkey  3 4 
Indonesia  3 4  UK  0 2 
Ireland  0 2  Uruguay  1 3 
Israel  0 0  USA  1 1 
Italy  1 2  Venezuela  2 4 
Jamaica  0 4  Zimbabwe  1 7  26
 
Table 3 Estimation results with separate crisis dummies 
 1982-1990  1991-1998  1982-1990  1991-1998 
Lag export  0.86976 (0.00323)***  0.86851 (0.00318)*** 0.86849 (0.00323)*** 0.86890 (0.00319)***
igdp  0.13149 (0.00533)***  0.11327 (0.00480)*** 0.12863 (0.00538)*** 0.10831 (0.00484)***
egdp  0.15080 (0.00585)***  0.13190 (0.00522)*** 0.15098 (0.00586)*** 0.13325 (0.00526)***
ipop  -0.01478 (0.00434)*** -0.00371 (0.00376)  -0.01154 (0.00436)***-0.00109 (0.00383) 
epop  -0.03950 (0.00446)*** --0.00734 (0.00378)* -0.03819 (0.00447)***-0.01016 (0.00386)***
idev  -0.18671 (0.01426)*** -0.06225 (0.02115)***-0.16387 (0.01501)***-0.07087 (0.02141)***
edev  -0.04301 (0.01421)*** -0.06271 (0.02124)***-0.03050 (0.01494)** -0.05268 (0.02147)***
lagidev  -0.05899 (0.01718)*** -0.01953 (0.01871)  -0.05678 (0.01830)***-0.02099 (0.01927) 
lagedev  0.06588 (0.01711)***  0.05136 (0.01877)*** 0.07026 (0.01825)*** 0.05198 (0.01928)***
lag2idev  0.19066 (0.02039)***  0.08434 (0.01346)*** 0.19057 (0.02114)*** 0.09188 (0.01374)***
lag2edev  -0.02843 (0.02021)  -0.03143 (0.01344)** -0.03533 (0.02099)*  -0.05060 (0.01367)***
bi  0.01191 (0.02405)  -0.12165 (0.02079)***   
be  -0.02214 (0.02382)  0.10471 (0.02077)***    
lagbi -0.07878  (0.02238)*** -0.08646 (0.02183)***   
lagbe -0.02052  (0.02231)  -0.01553 (0.02208)     
lag2bi -0.02929  (0.02294) -0.04187  (0.02201)*     
lag2be -0.04835  (0.02293)** -0.06378  (0.02227)***   
ci      -0.09436 (0.01609)***-0.07649 (0.01446)***
ce      -0.07407 (0.01617)***0.03537 (0.01441)** 
lagci      -0.07638 (0.01583)***-0.08108 (0.01498)***
lagce      -0.04656 (0.01595)***0.04742 (0.01496)***
lag2ci      -0.00918 (0.01551)  -0.03020 (0.01512)**
lag2ce      0.03137 (0.01558)**  0.02885 (0.01521)* 
dis  -0.12227 (0.00512)*** -0.11668 (0.00702)***-0.12028 (0.00766)***-0.11711 (0.00704)***
comland  0.08925 (0.03083)***  0.10719 (0.02808)*** 0.08780 (0.03076)*** 0.10574 (0.02811)***
nland  -0.01821 (0.01477)  -0.08939 (0.01317)***-0.00716 (0.01468)  -0.09212 (0.01318)***
nisland  0.04177 (0.00971)***  0.04011 (0.00874)*** 0.04648 (0.00967)*** 0.03844 (0.00874)***
year  0.01378 (0.00204)***  -0.01328 (0.00206)***0.01224 (0.00204)*** -0.01330 (0.00207)***
Observations 21500 20084 21500 20084
R² 0.9327  0.9473 0.9329 0.9472
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 4 Estimation results with both kinds of crisis 
 1982-1990 1991-1998
Lag export  0.86863 (0.00323)*** 0.86844 (0.00318)***
igdp  0.12788 (0.00538)*** 0.10963 (0.00485)***
egdp  0.15057 (0.00587)*** 0.13468 (0.00527)***
ipop  -0.01186 (0.00436)*** 0.00060652 (0.00384)
epop -0.03861  (0.00447)*** -0.01081 (0.00387)***
idev -0.16730  (0.01516)*** -0.06468 (0.02145)***
edev -0.02874  (0.01509)* -0.05658 (0.02153)***
lagidev -0.04889  (0.01846)*** -0.01034 (0.01951)
lagedev  0.07141 (0.01842)*** 0.04303 (0.01955)**
lag2idev  0.18519 (0.02121)*** 0.08749 (0.01396)***
lag2edev -0.03832  (0.02106)* -0.03564 (0.01392)***
bi  0.00727 (0.02414) -0.09415 (0.02212)***
be  -0.02139 (0.02391) 0.09248 (0.02210)***
lagbi -0.07255  (0.02267)*** -0.05597 (0.02255)**
lagbe  -0.01203 (0.02259) -0.03449 (0.02286)
lag2bi  -0.00815 (0.02318) -0.02217 (0.02234)
lag2be  -0.03053 (0.02319) -0.07947 (0.02261)***
ci  -0.08686 (0.01632)*** -0.04932 (0.01553)***
ce  -0.07142 (0.01641)*** 0.01902 (0.01548)
lagci -0.07985  (0.01599)*** -0.06788 (0.01535)***
lagce  -0.04558 (0.01611)*** 0.05128 (0.01535)***
lag2ci  -0.01080 (0.01560) -0.03417 (0.01528)**
lag2ce  0.02943 (0.01568)* 0.04003 (0.01538)***
dis  -0.11827 (0.00770)*** -0.11733 (0.00704)***
comland  0.09122 (0.03078)*** 0.10606 (0.02808)***
nland  -0.01102 (0.01477) -0.09101 (0.01317)***
nisland  0.04454 (0.00971)*** 0.03987 (0.00875)***
year  0.01150 (0.00205)*** -0.01366 (0.00207)***
Observations 21500 20084
R² 0.9329 0.9474
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
 
 
Table 5.1 The effects of banking crisis on trade 













Imports (short)  -      ?  ?  - 
Imports (longer)  -    -  -  ?  - 
Exports (short)  -  +    +  ?  + 
Exports (longer)  -  -  +  ?  ?  - 
? means unclear or insignificant. 
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Table 5.2 The effects of currency crisis on trade 















Imports (short)  -      -  - - 
Imports (longer)   -  - -  -  - - 
Exports (short)  -      -  - ? 
Exports (longer)   -  -  +  ?  -* + 
? means unclear or insignificant. 
* Accumulated effect was negative but tended to increase. 
 
Table 6 Estimation results with twin crisis dummies 
 1982-1990 1991-1998 
Lag export  0.86877 (0.00323)*** 0.86833 (0.00319)*** 
igdp  0.12765 (0.00539)*** 0.10960 (0.00486)*** 
egdp  0.15061 (0.00588)*** 0.13460 (0.00528)*** 
ipop  -0.01171 (0.00436)** 0.00089734 (0.00386) 
epop -0.03865  (0.00447)*** -0.01044 (0.00389)*** 
idev -0.15667  (0.01608)*** -0.06641 (0.02161)*** 
edev  -0.02151 (0.01599) -0.05560 (0.02235)** 
lagidev -0.06552  (0.02035)*** -0.01134 (0.01960) 
lagedev  0.06187 (0.02025)*** 0.04110 (0.01991)** 
lag2idev  0.19037 (0.02133)*** 0.08756 (0.01407)*** 
lag2edev -0.03601  (0.02118)* -0.03680 (0.01405)*** 
bi  0.01752 (0.02575) -0.08838 (0.03191)*** 
be  -0.00993 (0.02551) 0.10311 (0.02815)*** 
lagbi -0.08615  (0.02356)*** -0.06949 (0.03000)** 
lagbe  -0.02074 (0.02350) -0.03919 (0.03070) 
lag2bi  0.00052686 (0.02373) -0.02985 (0.02743) 
lag2be  -0.03660 (0.02376) -0.09457 (0.02784)*** 
ci  -0.08610 (0.01643)*** -0.04906 (0.01673)*** 
ce  -0.06722 (0.01653)*** 0.02059 (0.01613) 
lagci -0.08321  (0.01607)*** -0.07232 (0.01629)*** 
lagce  -0.04637 (0.01620)*** 0.04860 (0.01631)*** 
lag2ci  -0.00878 (0.01570) -0.03609 (0.01617)** 
lag2ce  0.02657 (0.01578)* 0.03514 (0.01628)** 
tci  -0.07250 (0.07379) -0.01222 (0.04424) 
tce  -0.08419 (0.07263) -0.02618 (0.04281) 
lagtci  0.17891 (0.09067)** 0.03273 (0.04514) 
lagtce  0.10041 (0.08874) 0.01055 (0.04540) 
lag2tci  -0.13564 (0.11350) 0.02193 (0.04579) 
lag2tce  0.16103 (0.11235) 0.04215 (0.04627) 
dis  -0.11825 (0.00770)*** -0.11755 (0.00705)*** 
comland  0.09047 (0.03078)*** 0.10623 (0.02808)*** 
nland  -0.01042 (0.01478) -0.09064 (0.01321)*** 
nisland  0.04481 (0.00971)*** 0.04019 (0.00878)*** 
year  0.01148 (0.00207)*** -0.01389 (0.00210)*** 
Observations 21500 20084 
R² 0.933 0.9474 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  29
 
Table 7 Estimation results with both “successful” and “unsuccessful” 
currency crisis dummies 
 1982-1990  1991-1998 
Lag export  0.86855 (0.00324)***  0.86796 (0.00320)*** 
igdp  0.12621 (0.00547)***  0.11027 (0.00488)*** 
egdp  0.15203 (0.00598)***  0.13519 (0.00530)*** 
ipop  -0.01021 (0.00443)**  0.00029741 (0.00385) 
epop  -0.03987 (0.00456)***  -0.01036 (0.00388)*** 
idev  -0.16159 (0.01536)***  -0.06904 (0.02209)*** 
edev  -0.02700 (0.01528)*  -0.04247 (0.02218)* 
lagidev  -0.04797 (0.01872)**  -0.00798 (0.01975) 
lagedev  0.07718 (0.01865)***  0.03514 (0.01978)* 
lag2idev  0.18412 (0.02152)***  0.08705 (0.01400)*** 
lag2edev  -0.05234 (0.02136)**  -0.03529 (0.01395)** 
bi  0.00495 (0.02417)  -0.09108 (0.02233)*** 
be  -0.02285 (0.02395)  0.08417 (0.02231)*** 
lagbi  -0.07791 (0.02281)***  -0.05444 (0.02268)** 
lagbe  -0.00509 (0.02274)  -0.04039 (0.02298)* 
lag2bi  -0.00653 (0.02327)  -0.02153 (0.02238) 
lag2be  -0.03390 (0.02329)  -0.08059 (0.02265)*** 
sci  -0.10246 (0.01748)***  -0.04392 (0.01641)*** 
sce  -0.06925 (0.01757)***  0.00505 (0.01636) 
lagsci  -0.08581 (0.01741)***  -0.06681 (0.01585)*** 
lagsce  -0.05739 (0.01751)***  0.05068 (0.01586)*** 
lag2sci  -0.01370 (0.01704)  -0.03521 (0.01570)** 
lag2sce  0.05255 (0.01709)***  0.04344 (0.01580)*** 
fci  0.01289 (0.04149)  -0.08822 (0.04050)** 
fce  -0.10889 (0.04199)***  0.11401 (0.04028)*** 
lagfci  -0.05894 (0.03678)  -0.06386 (0.06416) 
lagfce 0.01192  (0.03759)  -0.00087749  (0.06417) 
lag2fci  0.01488 (0.03678)  -0.00998 (0.06430) 
lag2fce  -0.08725 (0.03752)**  -0.00735 (0.06431) 
dis  -0.11826 (0.00770)***  -0.11804 (0.00705)*** 
comland  0.09110 (0.03077)***  0.10594 (0.02808)*** 
nland  -0.01006 (0.01485)  -0.09101 (0.01318)*** 
nisland  0.04415 (0.00971)***  0.04004 (0.00876)*** 
year  0.01141 (0.00206)***  -0.01402 (0.00214)*** 
Observations 21500  20084 
R² 0.933  0.9474 




















































































































































































































Figure 4.1 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (without currency 













Figure 4.2 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (without currency 















Figure 5.1 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (without banking 













Figure 5.2 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (without banking 
















Figure 6.1 Impulse response functions induced by banking crisis (with currency crisis 










































Figure 7.2 Impulse response functions induced by currency crisis (with banking crisis 
dummies): 1991-1998 